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IRRGATION LAWS OF THE WST.
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IIRRI)QATION LAWS
OF THE WSST.
Of the great region lying west of the MielsiSdl-
ppi, only a vex1y small portion can be cultivated
without the aid of Irrigation* Vast areae in Q lordQ,
Arizona and ealifornis are parched ,alkaline ad arid.
The 1mal mountain steams serve to mark here and there
the brown plain, with a vivid line of green; and tho
greater stoevD like the Arkansas and the )Platte huwl
themselves tumultuously from out :their da&r,narrqpw
canons, to be Swallowed up only too soon in the tLI ..I
desert. The clouds which float in white masses over
the plains hardly di1till more than & passing shower
upon the parched earth. Little wonder that in such a
region water should be osdered almost as valualle
as the gold or silve? hidden within the depths of the
mountains. And in dealing with the subject of
irrigation the assemblies of the people have a most
Serious matter for ligislation and the courts for
c ons truct i ofn.
9'
naturally in the process of application of th& law,
to an entirely new and strange situation, severaul
different theories have arisen. s3ince some adopt the
Common law , and some employ it with variations and
yet others have displayed a startling originality
of their own in dealing with the subjectthe reault is
interesting but slightly *omplicated. Prof Pomeroy
is the only Jurist who has extlored systematically
the western wilderness of decisions relatirg to
irrigation and his lectures on "Riparian Rights"- will
prove a valuable guide to anyone investigating ths
new field open to legal study.
In dealing with the laws relating to
irrigation I $hall Oonsder them under the following
heads:
A* ommon law theory of Ripariai Rights,
Bt Irrigation in relation to the public donzLn.
C. The yestem in Oalifornia and Nevada,
D. oolorado system*
3(vi1vk LAW THEORY F RIPARIAN RIGHTS.
In dealing with such an unstable element as water
the common law found an exoelent subject for its well-
known subtelty of interpretation and distinction,
The common lay started with the premise
derived from the Roman Law that water was publici JustS,
an element wherein the people had an Interest which
extended to the use of It but it was in no sense
bonum vacuns, so that the first occupant could make
his right absolute to the exclusion of the Interest
of others.
A few of the early English cases follow
the civit law which holds that water is the property
of the prior appropriator to the extent of his appro-
priation Ad this is adopted by many of the western
states, But the true doctrine of the common law as
adopted by the English courts regard the proprietors
as posseWi iC only a usufructuary interest In the
waters of a stream whereby he could use a reasonable
amnonnt provided the stream was not lowered appreciably
which would constitute an injury to others holding
lands upon the ,same stream.
4In J3brey v .vwen ( 3 2 353*), an important case
the court says as to the aourt which may be utiliZed
by the consumert "It is entirely a question of degree
and it is impossible to define precisely the limits
which seperate the reasonable from the wiongful use o-f
the water,"
This right of the reparian proprietor to
the use of the water is a corporeal heredtament it is
"Inseperably annexed tb the soil and passes with It not
as an easement or apurtenarme but as pareeltuse d1d not
create it and disuse cannot destroy it*"
Yet this right Is in the nature of an
easement as the proprietors estate Is dominant when
he makes use of the ,water and servient to the right of
others to have the water ?low over his land so tkat
they ray use it.
It is understocd that the natural righto of
the proprietors may be affected by the appropriation
of the water by one of their number in derogation of
their claims for the s pace ef twenty years. This is
title obtained by prescription and presupposes a grant,
Also the riparian proprietor has the right at common
law to the use of the water for his natural wants,
to supply his family 4nd stock with an amount suffi(ient
to their needs, though the entire stream should be
consumedo
It was ingeniously argued in Evans v
Merriweather ( 3 Soune 496. ) that in arid reglons like
the West the use of water for irrigation would be a
-natural want and therefore would Justify, the use of
the water to the l4mit f the necessity. This was
reJected in Texas and California, but it forms part of
the foundation on which the doctrine by priority
of appropriation rests*..The doctrine of the common
law prevails., as stated above. generally through out
the United States with the exceptions of certain
Jurisdictions which will be mentioned further on.
0IRRIGATION IN RELATIQN TO THE PUBLIC DOAINo
The Act of Uongress passed the
10th, o july "1466 is the basis of all water rights
on the public lands;it Is as follows:
"Whenever by priority of possession, rights to
the use of water for nutacturnf,miningagriculture
or other purposes have accrued and the same are
recognized and acknowledged by the local customs~aws
and decisions of the courts, the possessor and owner
of such vested rights shall be maintained and respected
in the same; a d the right of way for the construction
of ditches ard canals for the purposes herein
apeolfied is acknowledged and enjoined,"
Amendment July 9th, 1820o;
*All patents granted or presotiptions or homesteads
allowed, shall be subject to any vested rights or
accrued water rights or rights to ditches and
reservoirs used In corection with such water rights
as roay have been acquired under or recognised by the
ninth section of such act as this is amendatory,"
The working of this statute is as the
7supreme ourt romarls rather unfortunate. And its
Oonstruotion has given rise to a considerable un-
Certainty in interpretation by the courts. Though
Oongress grounds, the rights of the miners and settlers
on the Custorm, statutes and decisions of the several
ekates, the real basis for the doctrine of appropriation
oa the publidomain is the-reeegnition by the states
of an-implied liemm ,to the appropriation by pri'r
right- on the publiO domain# by the United -Stat*a
to ue the #ater -as the government is in fat the
only party who has the right to object, ,For in
Californis the statute and decisions of the courts
which are ofuzore authority than the tount-ar of .the
settloza, adopt the ocomionaw sytem of water righte
which isldiametricall p'o11e& to the doctrine
of ppreprioat ion and yet the latter oontrols on the
public lands*
The courts 0±' the Wester states
following the supreme court of the United 8tates
decide that priority of appropriation is valid against
the pat ent ee of the governmnt who obt ains his pat ent
subsequent to the..' passage of the act of 186 and if
the prior appropriation of the water of a stream is
8subsequent to the said act it will avall against- a
later patent,
But suppose the priority of approprsla
tion and the issving of the patent to the land both
antedate the statute what effect will this have on the
relation of the prior appropriator and the patentee
from the government., If A.appropXIates the water of
a stream to his beneficial use in 188Q and B.'in 1864
obtains Land upon the stream under governmert patent.
must B's rigt as a riparian owner be subject to A's
use of the water, This question was first decided
in the important oases of Van Sikle v Haines ( 7 Nov
41 j and Lux v Haggin ( U Pa.Rep. 6144.)4Judge
Lewis of the Nevada oourt in an elaborate opinion held,
that a patent issued prior to 1866 conveyed to the
patentee not only the land but the right to the use
of the water of the stream flowing through it. Since
the United States has the absolute and perfect title
to land and there can be no presoription against the
government it follows that the prior appropriation be±oe
the statute must yield tG the subsequent patentee.
The statute of 1886 is prospective in its action and
9relates to rights arising after its passage. But
this case is overruled in Jones v Adams ( 19 NeVP, 86d.
as touching the doctrine above stated. Th* Supreme
Court of the United States has not had this question
directly before it. In Broder v Water Co. ( 101 UoS. 04)
it was said that the act of IR66 "was rather a
recognition of a pre-exrieting pight of poeessln,
constituting a valid olaimito Its oontinued uae,than
the establishment of a new one. "on this case and
especially this clause the Oolorado and Nevada courts
b as C
havetheir decisions that the appropriatoro before
the statute has the right to water as against the
subsequent patentee of the gove~rnnt, But In Lux v
Jaggin the Galifornla court holds that this language
cannot be construed as a recognitlon by the court of
vested rights in appropriatores of water created by
mre appropriation rid independent of statute," Also
Gould on Wstoem to the same effeot.#The statute is
prospectivein it operation and does not affect a
pat eA i-ued before its passage or a patent subsequent-
ly issued to a person who had paid for the land prior
to the act,"
The language of the Unit ed Stat es court in
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Broder v water Go. shows a tendency toward the recogni-
tion of the doctrine, of appropriation as pre-Oexistet
to the statute and the amendment of' IM ,when it
says that patents ,hbmesteads,etc, are subject to
*such water rights as may have been acquired under or
recognized by the ninth section of sbch act/it seem
especially intended to protect the interest of the
prior appropriator jtwhat soever time he may have
acquired the right to the water. It must be remember-
ed that the act of 1866 was framed to give protection
to those who depending on the implied license of the
government had taken water somet imes at great expense
and used It in mining or the cultivation of the soil
and the act was merely confirmative of this license,
The 8tate courts have recognized expressly that the
doctrine of appropriation obtains on the public land
of the United States aside from any that may exist under
the state statutes, It Is certain that so far as the
United States has recognized any dootrine as applicable
to the streams on the public domain it has been the
doctrine of' appropriation and not the common law
theory of' riparian rights.
Ii
If however both parties are mere occupant3 and
have -acquired no title to the land from the govern.
ment there is no questionthat as between them ,the
one making the prior appropriation pf the waters of .a
stream cannot be disturbed in his right to the amunt
appropriated by a subsequent appropriator though the
latter should hold his land on the banks of the
stream , while the prior appropriator should dwell at
a distance and transport the water by means of ditches.
is
THEC ALIFORIlA AND NSVADA DOTRINE.
The common law theory of water righta,
rendered venerable by precedent tpd secure by authority
seemed destined for a time to hold a large part of.the
4eat against the enoroachments of the new doctrine of
appropriation by priority of use, judge Mckinstrey of
the aliforniaasupreme courzt&f4d udge Lewis of tha,.
Nevada court, two of the most eminent Jurists the west
has pjv.L*#d-, joined the shlelds of their protection
over the common law theory. Also Prof. Pomeroywith this
great learning and extraordinar grasp of legal
principles cawe to the aid of Galifornia and Nevada
Courts, But in spite of these distinguished champions,
the corx.uion law theory has lost ground until finally it
has retreated to its last stronghold in alifornia.
The California Code from section
1410 to 1421. enacts ezpressly that priority by appro-
priation shall prevail and providi the methods by
whi+ch it shall be accomplished i But section LI22 of
of the civil code is as follows;
"The rights of riparian proprietors
are not affected by the provisions of this title,"
Lux v Haggin ( 10 Pao Rep* 739,.), a case
which has been rightly said)constitutes a thorough
treatise on water rights, holds that this section
protects not only riparian rtghteL;-'of those who acquir-
ed a title to land from the state after the adoption
of the code and before appropriati n of water In
accordanwe with the provisions of the code. 4oW uConalus°
iob'"says judge Imkinstrey ' on this branch of the
case Is that section 1422 saves and, protects the.
ripiaria rights of all those who under the land laws
of the -4tato shall have acquired from the state the
right of :posession to *tract. of riparlan land
prior to the initiation of proceeding to appropriate
water in accordance with the provisions of the code.
The State might have reserved from her grants of land
the waters flowing through them for the benefit of
those who Should subsequently appropriate the waters,
but the statute has not -made such reservation, The
water rights of the state as riparian proprietor,are
not reserved to the state by section 14 £ (whenever the
state has not already parted with its right to th ose
who have acquired from her a legal title to riparian
lands |the provisi ns of the code confer the Staters
rights to the flow on those appr'opriating water In the
manner pr esrlbed by the cOde.e
This Oonstruetion takes all the
force from the statutes There ixists two system then
in California , but the e~mmon law one prevails to the
greatest extent. For If the State grant land on a
streasm to a person; he inmedlately obtains the rights
of a riparian proprietor and bls estate shuts off 4ll
subsequent attempta at appropriation, for they would
of necessity diminish hia right to the flow of the
stream. The comnon Jaw idea of water rights was then
saved in California by .a strained construction of the
etatute, But it has not escaped without ivotifieation
In Harri. v Harrison (93 Cala. 631.),it was held that
the reasonable uae of the water of a ctream permit.s so
much to be taken as to appreciably diminish the flow
to the lower riparian proprietor. This is a deroga-
tion from the strict construction of the rights of a
riparian proprietor at commom law.
Prof. Pomeroy when he published his
lectures on riparian A rigtsin la.43,elased. Nevada with
Ualifornia and based his staten~ent on the eaae of Van
8ickle v Eaine. IBut thie has been ubsequently overrul-
ed both as regards the right of the appropriator to
wat er a. against the pat enrtee of the government whos e
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patent was issued prior to 1866,and the declaration that
the conon law furnished the prinolples for water
rights In the state of nevada,
Pierce *amp works v Stevenson ( Nev 2 73.).
In this latter case appropriaticn by priority is
expreesly adopted.
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TH CO LO RAD SYSTEM.
The following are the sectione of the Colorado
cortilsution, wherein the theory of appropriation Is
declared.
8ec.*10. " The water of every natural strean, not hereto-
fore appropriated, wit un, %he state of Colorado is
hereby declared to be the property of the public,and
the same is dedicated to the tie of the people of-the
State subject to appropriation as hereinaft er provided#
Sec 511,w The right to divert the unappropriated
waters of any natural stream for beneficial unes shall
never bf denied, r16i1J of appropriation shall give
the better right as between those using the water ?or
the same purpose, but when the waters of any natural
stream are not sufficient for the service of all those
desiring the use of the same, those using the water
for domestic purposes shAli have the preference over
those claiming for any other purpose,and those using
the water for agriculturl ptrnpoaes 1hall have the
preference over those using the same for m~rnufacturing
p urpo se•s."
This system is formulated in the above
sections, yet q t based upon them for the right
is a prior one , it exists aside from any statute
and can only be denied by express enactment.
Acoordingly It would seem that when the early settlers
took the water from the stream, it was done not by
sufferarme of the state but bya natural right
inhereent In the conditions of a new country.
The w-- of the application of the
water is not material to the appropriation. The water
may be conveyed by a ditch from a strea ,acroassan
intervening divide to some distant ranohe. This
illustrates the radical difference between this
new theory and the one which prevailed at comon 1aw;
fr the latter is based on the rights of the riparian
proprietors to the water. This method of distribution
is prefectly logical under the Oclorado system. Since
it is the prior beneficial use of the water that
confers the right to it, there can be no difference
whether it is applied on the land near the stream or
4t a great distance. The water is the appropriators to
apply to a certain purpose and not to a particular
place. in a couictr like england which lies swathed
in heavy clouds during all seasons of the year' it
would be undoubtedly an invasion of private right to
conduct t;he water away from the riparian proprietor;but
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throughout the 4est water is an imperative necessity
for the pursuit of agriculture and use npt position
give the right to the water#
Qoff in v Left hand Ditch Cow ( 8 6 olo,'W40 .);.
jie imust now inquire more part:cularly as
to what constitutes approprxiation, so as to be valid
agairat subsequent parties. The right dose not date
from the actual applicatlon of the water to the SOi,
but from the time the frst step is taken if it Ia
followed up ,;Yith reasonable promptness. Thua,If a
ranch4mtns. begins the construction of his ditch on
Zuly first , and by the middle of August has the water
flowing on his fields the apprpriation dates from July
let, proyiding there has been no %jnreasonable delay
in prosecuting the work.
"Although the appropriation is not
deemed complete until the actual diversicn of the water
still if such has been prosecuted with reasonable
diligence, the right relates to the time when the
first satep was taken to secure it."
Liker et al v JFink etal ( 7 Cblo. 1514 .
The next. elemient ini the theory of
appropriation is the application of the water to some
useful purpose . The prior appropriator will not be
Gllowed to waste the water merely because he was the
first to take it from the stwean. But so long as he
applies the quantity originally appropriated ore
can cot--plaln, though the last drop of water be consum-
ed,
It is however provided by statute that zai
time od '~a c-h t . when the water becomes low tho'ase
livir on the steam can use all of it if neceS$ary
for domestic purposesi even if the prior approprii,tor
has none for his land, A manufacturer who has a
certain amount of water appropriated for his purpogi
must in times of scarcity of water give way to the nLes
of the ranchimen for irrigaticn. This is but just
and equitable , and is declared by the conmon law
doctrine as well.
THEI-IJGHTS CF DITCH CQI-,PANI .
When the Colorado Court came to consider the
status of diteh companies conveying water for the use
of the ranchemen it waz confronted with & question
complex and difficult.
The Company does not have cny ownership in
the water# It is merely an agent to carry the water
to the consumer. But as regards the outside world and
subsequent, appropriators its priority of right to the
water cannot be assailed. It is not strictly an agent,
common carrierer, or owner but combines some of the
elements from these three legal conceptions,
Wheeler v Northern Colo. I. Co. is the first
ease which considers systematically the rights of the
ditch corporations under the system of appropriation
Judge Helm states the conclusion of the courto as
followsl "After appropriation the title tc this water,
save perhaps as to the limited quantity that may be
tatually flowing in the consumers ditch or lateral
remains In the general public while the paramount
right to Its use unless forfeited continues in the
appropriation, The Colorado doctrine of ownership and
appwopriation as declared in the constitution, statutes
and .decisions necessarily gives the carrier of
water an exceptional status;a status differing some-
what from that of the ordinary carrier. Qertain peculi
ar rights are acquired in connection with the water
diverted; they are dependent for their birth and con-
tinued ezistence on the use made by the consumer. Eut
the carrier does not become the proprietor of the water
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diverted. The carrier does not possess a saleable
interest in the water.
Under the constitution the carr*er is
a quasi-wpublic servant or agente It is not the attitude
of a private individual contracting for the sale or
use of property. It is permitted to acquire certain
rights against those subsequently diverting from the
same natural stream. It may exercise the power of
eminent domain, It is charged with a public trust only
to exact reasonable rates*"
This is as full and clear an
exposition of the right of water carrters as the reports
furnisho Yet it impresses one as a composite photogr-.
aph of a group of legal corceptions and perhaps it is
futile to expect a true unity in such a blending,
It is not a carrier strictly because compensation is
hot paid for the carrying of the water but for its use
aMthe property is neither in the carrier or the -
consumer. It is not the owner because the state
occupies that poSition though it possesses some of the
rights of ownership. It is not strictly an agent becaus-.
e the iznietive lies with the company anid as regards the
Status it is more nearly a trustee,
There is force in the view taken by
Judge Reed, in the case of Wyatt v Laimer ( 1 Colo. Ct.
of Appeals 4 ,o9 that the 'compa iy. La .-. C1
tarrier but is a corporation with the title to the water
and subject to legislativre control on account of its
quasil-public furations, However the Supreme cOUrt
overruled this case in Wyatt v Irrigaticn Co. 18
Colo. 3(8..
A moot question has arisen as to the
privitles of consumers taking water from the canal of
the carrier. udge Helm in FoH.L.C.c R. CQ. v Southworth
(J3 Colo. 112, held that the coneumershave priority of
even date and the statute requiring that consumers
shall pro ratt in times of scarcity is not affected by
the claim to priority by a consumer ,because he may
have used the water from the ditch before some other.
The appropriation is completed by the consumer putting
the Water to a beneficial use and the priority vests
for its protection in the ditch company against the
clairm Qf the other companies or individuals who
are subsequent appropriators
Judge Elliot t held on the other hand
C) r'
(.j q -)
that there was priority of appropriation among the
consumers, In the same manner as if they were taking
the water from the natural stream. The carrher is
striCtly an agent. The water of the natural stream
irrespective of the mode of diversion is dedicated to
the public. There are two priorities,- the carriers
established by statute as amatter of convenience and the
Consumers priority based on the law of nature. And the
statute in regard to prorating applies only where the
ditch is constructed as a conm.n enterprise by the
various consumers.
This appears well enough in theory,
but as Judge Helm pointed out it would lead to perplex-
ing results in practice, ince the determinatiQn of
numerous priorities arising so close together in time
would lead to endless litigation. It would also seem
that the system of double priorities is illogical.
For the cases have declared that the doctrine of appro-
priation by priority is derived from the natural law
and the statutes are merely deW' larat ns of this right
and it carnot be divisible into a priority by conven-
ience and by natural right. There cannot be two
seperete priorities existing in the same water at the
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same time , as the priority of the canal company and
the consumer. This question has not yet been decided
in the Colorado court, since in this case Judge hayt
placed his decision on a technicality. But the
practical necessities of the situation will doubtless
lead the court to adoot the view of Zudge t-elm.
The next question that arises in the consider&l
tion of this subject is the exact nature of the right
to water acquired by apprcpriation. At cormon law the
water of a stream passed as incident to the land. It was
a parcel of it and not regarded as appurtenanteAnder
the theory which w;e are considering the right to. the
use of the ,iater is admitted to be property ,but of
what kind is an uraettled question,
The right to vrater acquired by appropriat-
ion i- species of the realty ad requires for it
transfer the same form and solemnity as is required
for the oniveyanCe of any other part of the real
estate," 8mtth V C'Idara ( 4.3 Cal. 37i.)"
" The appropriators right to have the
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water flow in the natural stream to the head of the
ditch is an incorpovial hereditament appurtenant to his
dit ch." 1 16 Cal# 4(8o)*
In Uolorado the deeisions have gone
further in developing the ±dea that water acquired by
priority of appropriation is a distf tproperty r~ght.
"Water instead of being a mere incident to the soil
rises when appropriated to the dignity of an usufruct-
uary es-tate, or right in prxperty!"
offin v Left Hand Ditch Col 6 Colo.)
In the leading case of "trikler v Colo,
springs ( 16 Qci. j614,it ,as held " THat water
originally -applled to specific land for irrigation
could be sold and taken out at a different point,
could be carried in a difforont ditch in no way
connected with the land itid c9uld by the purchaser be
applied to a different and distant use. It logically
follows, that the right to the w-e of the water for
irrigation is a right not so inseperabl. connected
with the lnrId that it ay not be coperatd there fm.%m
The authorities seemn to corcur in the conclusion,
that the priority to the use of water is a property
righto To lihmit its transfer would. in many eases
*destro r its valuer What differense can it make to other s
26
whether the owner of the priority in this case uses
the water of his o.n land or sells it to others,"
This case shows a tenwlency to regard
this property in water aseperate pe rronal property.
This View is followed out in 1 Colo. tV.of Appeals 494
r,,here the vuateir is regarded as a chattel subject to
the same rules as govern personal property.
This was however overruled in 13 Col
, where it was decided* that the propercy in water
was. an easement and passed as appurtenant to the
land , except that its source of supply and place of
use might be changed. " The natural water course or
the ditch occupies the positioln of the servient
estate and the very ext tence cf -water rigrht equires
a us? !hich constitutes the dominant estate."
The phrase "proe-%ty ight" as
ap*led by the courts to the water acquired by
appropriation is vague and unsatisfactory And when
a closer definition is attempted confusion results.
It is difficult to see how an easement can arise ,
Sinc e presc ripti n c annt run agai nst the 3t ate, a~d
the water is not taken by grant but through appropriat-
ion 0 Alwo an easement is generally regar~ded as being
27
appurtenant to a particular estate and is hardly
transferable at vill. ior is a stream strictly a
servient estate for an estate implieo an individual
owner and the stream is public juris.
whatever confuncon may arise as to the
exact natlure of the oroperty in water there is one
essential characteristic t.at must always be found ,
that is the continued appltcaticn of the w-ater to a
beneficial use There can be no absolute title
conveyed to the vter and on failure tt use it gas
required .the vwater beco es again subject to the
public Jurik.
Prof. Poimeroy in his work on iiparian
I
sights has pr'ed~icted theAc onseuences ;Jhich must
logically arise under the Color-ado systemw-
1. Private lands are invaded for the corstruction of
ditches but thiz is regulated bF statixte so that the
lands of' the individual proprietor cannot be burdened
by more than one ditChE It Is understood that the
land condemed for right cf way must be paid fo.4
2. As the country becomes .ore thickly settled there
will be endless litigaticn and controver-sies arising
out of disputed claimtS t priority.
As matter of fact ,there are comparRV
ively few cases in the western reports on the subject
of irrigation. DEut it was tc be expected that in
fixing the rules of a new system there would be a
cerxtain amount of litigation. It is the price paid for
development alorne original lines,
3. No legislation can be just or practical or can
tend to peace and prosperity which attempts to violate
and override natural laws and natural rightsT the
inunutable truths which exist in the regular ordea of
nat ur e..
None ':votld care to take issue ".%ith this
earnest declaration of the preeminence of the natural
lat; in legal jurisprudence or in the order of nature,
T-4t this natural law is not attained by deduction
from th*e apriorL principles handed down by sorme
teutozxic philosopher but is reached through induction,
The peculiar conditions and requirements of a new
country are facts from which new principles of natural
law are derived *The common:, law: of rgln.ino
of necessity the common law of Arnerica, The system of
appropriation is the ot recent illustration of the
Common law in the vestern states risinp out of natural
conditions peculiar to those states.
It is true thet thts system h ,
certain inconsistenciesbut this is tc be expected of a
theory in the prooess of constructicn. Lut Th7en the
scaffolding turnished<y he ol er theories is removed
the doctrine of appropriation by priority will stand
complete without incongruity or inconsistency.
XPCz -.

